The Optimal Rate of Decline of an Inefficient Industry by Rees, Ray & Forster, B. A.
Journal of Public Econormcs 22 (1983) 227-242 North-Holland 
THE OPTIMAL RATE OF DECLINE OF AN INEFFICIENT 
INDUSTRY 
Bruce A FORSTER 
Unwerstty of Guelph, Guelph, Ontarro, Canada 
Ray REES* 
Umverszty College, Cardlff CFI IXL, UK 
Received October 1981, revised version received May 1983 
Thus paper considers the problem of the optimal tune path of contractlon of an industry which 
has been hit by foreign competltlon, and shows that m general, along the optimal path, a 
production subsidy IS warranted The optnnal subsidy trades off the benefit of unemployment m 
speeding up the approach to the new long-run equlhbnum agamst he cost of lost output m the 
‘meffkxent’ mdustry The dynanuc shadow pnce of labour m this Industry IS also derived and 
shown to be always positive, though below the industry wage rate 
1. Introduction 
This paper 1s concerned with the followmg problem a major mdustry 
becomes, as a result of foreign competltlon, unprofitable at its current 
output The output level at which it 1s viable 1s considerably below the 
existing one How rapidly, therefore, should it contract? 
In the pohcy debates surrounding particular instances of this problem, for 
example the steel, shlpbmldmg, motor car and coal industries m the United 
Kingdom, two extreme positions often tend to be adopted The protectlomst 
posltlon 1s to use import controls, tariffs or production subsIdles to mamtam 
as far as possible the status quo The free trade posltlon 1s to allow the 
market mechamsm to bring about the resource reallocations which the 
change m competitive condltlons has necessitated In practice, an 
intermediate pragmatic pohcy 1s often followed productlon subsidies 
(possibly facilitated by taking the industry mto public ownership, If It 1s not 
already a public enterpnse) and trade barriers are used to moderate, but not 
negate, the effects of the foreign competltlon That is, measures are taken to 
slow the transition to the new eqmhbnum 
*Versions of this paper have been presented at seminars at Queen’s Umverslty, Kmgston, and 
at the Umversities of Guelph, McMaster, and Waterloo m Ontano, Canada, and Sheffield, 
Swansea, and Bath m the U K We are grateful to the partlclpants m those semmars and to the 
referees for many helpful comments 
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Such a pohcy tacitly recogmses the mefiiaencles inherent m each of the 
extreme posltlons To seek to mamtam the status quo implies a contmumg 
loss in real national income arising from the failure to adJust To allow the 
unimpeded operation of market forces results m higher levels of 
unemployment - and therefore losses of output - which may be brought 
down only very slowly, at a rate dependent on the extent of wage rigidity 
and the costs of relocation and re-trammg of labour 
The analysis of this paper provides support for the pragmatic, intermediate 
posltlon The view underlying the analysis 1s that the problem 1s essentially 
one of dynamic optlmlsatlon, and therefore cannot be successfully solved 
with the standard static models ’ Thus, we seek to characterlse xphcltly the 
optimal contractzon path for an industry which 1s mltlally ‘meficlent’, m a 
sense to be defined 
An important concept m many applied cost-benefit studies m this area 1s 
the ‘shadow price of labour’ [see Jenkins and Montmarquette (1979), N B P I 
(1970), and H M Treasury (1977)] An interesting Joint product of our 
analysis 1s a characterlsatlon of a dynamzc shadow price of labour, given by 
the margmal social opportunity cost of labour along the optimal adjustment 
path The important qualitative property of this 1s that while m general it 1s 
below the wage rate m the dechmng industry, it 1s slgmticantly above zero 
(even ignoring the question of workers’ valuation of leisure) as long as 
unemployment mfluences the process of resource reallocation m the 
economy 
In the followmg se&on we set out the basic model Section 3 then seeks to 
give some insight mto the problem by carrying out a comparative statics 
analysis using a dlagrammatlc techmque developed by Neary (1978, 1981) 
Section 4 then carries out the dynamic optlmlsatlon and the concludmg 
section discusses the pohcy significance of the results 
2. The model 
There are several senses m which an industry may be said to be 
‘mefflclent’ First, it may be operating with a technology which produces a 
gven output with more of at least one input and no less of any other than 
an alternative known technology Secondly, it may be using the best 
technology but with non-cost-mmlmlsmg input levels, and m particular 
excess labour Thirdly, although cost-mmlmomg with respect to the best- 
known technology it may be over-expanded relative to the output which 1s 
viable at prevailing (world) market prices 
It seems true to say that all three types of mefflclency have been present m 
‘As far as we are aware, only one previous paper takes a dynamic approach to tins type of 
problem see Lapan (1976) We dxuss the relatlonsinp of Lapan’s analysis with that offered m 
this paper m section 4 below 
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some, and at least one of them m all, of the mdustnes m the UK whose 
dechne has caused major pohcy problems - motor cars, steel, coal, 
shlpbmldmg and textlles On the other hand, the economic (as opposed to 
the pohtlcal) solution of the first two types of problem IS straightforward the 
economy 1s operating m the mterlor of Its production set and everyone 
(mcludmg any displaced workers) can be made better off by correctmg the 
mefflclency no loss of output 1s involved In the third case, on the other 
hand, there 1s a genuine pohcy trade-off In any economy m which labour 
cannot be centrally directed, unemployment 1s part of the mechanism of 
adlustment and so there is a trade-off between the extent of unemployment 
(and associated output losses) and the speed of adjustment In order to 
concentrate on this problem we take mto account m this paper only the 
third type of mefiiiaency, and this determmes our choice of formal model 
We assume a two-good, two-input economy which IS a price-taker m 
world trade It imports good Y and exports good X It produces each good 
with standard neo-classical production functions under constant returns to 
scale The economy 1s mltlally m full neo-clasncal equlhbnum the two 
inputs, labour (L) and capital (K) are fully employed, the wage rates m each 
sector, w, and w,, are equal to each other and to the margmal value product 
of labour m each sector and likewise the rental rates on capital, rx and r,,, 
are equal both to each other and to the margmal value product of capital m 
each sector There 1s perfect competltlon m both sectors and so profits are 
zero The production equlhbrmm can be described therefore by the followmg 
six equations 
~“(w,, r ) = 1, 
YY(W,~ ry)= r-4 
Y”,(w,, r )X = ~2, 
Y:(w,, r,)X = K,O, 
Here y” and yy are the unit cost functions’ m X and I: respectively, 
JJ”, E&“/~w,, etc ,3 X 1s the numermre and p IS the (world) pnce of Y m 
‘That IS to say, the rmnlrmsed cost of producing one unit of the correspondmg output at the 
gven mput prices Ckven our assmnptlon about production functions these umt cost functions 
are welldefmed 
?he denvative of the umt cost function of X with respect o the wage (resp rental) Bves the 
amount of labour (resp capital) reqmred to produce one umt of X, and hkewlse for Y 
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terms of X, L,O and L,” are respectively the labour supplies to X and Y m the 
mltlal eqmhbnum, Kz and KY” the correspondmg capital supphes, and X, Y 
denote the outputs, as opposed to consumptlons,4 of the two goods Thus (1) 
and (2) are zero profit condltlons, (3)--(6) input equlhbrmm condltlons 
Because the economy 1s mltlally m full neo-classical eqmhbrmm, w, = wy and 
Y, = r,, If we were to assume complete mob&y of capital, then of course (4) 
and (6) could be summed and equated to K” SK: +K,O, the economy’s 
aggregate m&al stock of capital Likewise, full labour moblhty would imply 
that we could sum (3) and (5) and equate this to Z’ - Lz + Ly”, the economy’s 
aggregate labour supply But since we shall m this paper assume various 
kinds of factor lmmoblhty we take (3)-(6) as the general case 
Suppose now that the price of the Imported good, p, falls once and for all 
to a new level p This could be because there has been entry mto the world 
market by a slgmficant number of new low-cost producers We know that, as 
a result, this mltlal production equlhbrmm 1s inefficient Y should contract 
and X expand The problem we pose here is How rapidly should this 
reallocation take place? 
3. Diagrammatic analysis 
Fig 1 is an extension of a &agram constructed by Neary (1978) In fig 
l(a) are plotted the factor pnce frontier? for X and T: respectively, where FSj 
and F,” correspond to the lmtlal price p and F; corresponds to the new price 
j Thus, Fz shows the set of (w,,r,) pan-s which satisfy eq (l), and F,” shows 
the set of (wy,ry) pan-s satlsfymg (2) At the mltlal eqmhbrmm E” the 
mtersectlon of the frontiers determines the wage and rental rates, w” and r” 
It 1s assumed, since we want to study the consequences of wage rigidity m I: 
that this 1s the labour-lntenswe sector Hence, the slope of FF, which 1s the 
capital-labour ratio m I: 1s flatter than that of FE at the equlhbrmm 
In fig l(b) we show the eqmhbrmm m the labour market DE 1s the mltlal 
demand curve for labour m X, with L, measured rightward from the ongm 
O,, and 0,” IS the lmtlal labour demand curve m x with L, measured 
leftward from the origin 0, The lmtlal equlhbrmm labour allocation at wage 
rate w” 1s then Lz, LF 
Fig l(c) 1s a conventional Edgeworth-Bowley box, with labour along the 
horizontal side and capital on the vertical O,O, 1s the locus of lsoquant 
tangencies The mltlal equlhbrmm capital allocation 1s therefore Kz, K,” 
When the pnce of Y falls to jj, the factor pnce frontier F,” m (a) undergoes 
a radial shift inward to Fk, with Fz unchanged The new ‘full eqmhbrmm’ 1s 
‘In fact, because the economy IS assumed to be a price-taker m world trade, there IS a 
separation between consumption and productlon and we proceed entirely m terms of the latter 
‘Mussa (1979) gives a thorough discussion of this diagram and applies It to Illustrate a 
number of important theorems m international trade theory 
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at E’ with wage rate w’ and rental r’ In (b), the effect of the price fall 1s to 
shift the labour demand curve m Y to 0; However, m the case where capital 
1s fully mobile, capital as well as labour shifts from Y to X, causing both 
labour demand curves to shift further and a final equlhbrlum 1s reached at 
B’ Given that both inputs are fully mobile and factor prices flexible, 
therefore, the economy ends up producmg at G’ m (c), the new full neo- 
classical eqmhbnum 
Now consider the sector-speafic apital case (the analysis here 1s a mirror 
image of that carried out by Neary) All input adJustments are confined to 
the horizontal lme K$ K," m (c), smce capital does not shift between sectors 
The new demand curve D; m (b) gives a new labour market equlhbnum at 
B”, lmplymg a labour allocation L!!L; The eqmhbrlum wage rate w” m (a) 
now implies unequal rental rates ry” and rl: m Y and X, respectively We can 
establish the followmg mequahtles among the proportionate rates of change6 
(denoted by “) 
which are reflected m the figure The sector-speatic capital assumption 
nnphes that the economy 1s off its ‘long-run’ contract locus m (c), essentially 
6For the method of denvmg these mequahtles, ee Jones (1971) 
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because the margmal value product of capital m X( =r!J exceeds that m 
Y( =r,“) Over tune, we would expect capital to be reallocated m response to 
this divergence m rental rates, but m the short to medium term the 
divergence will persist 
As long as we have input pnce flexlhhty, the only question relating to 
dynamic adlustment is that of the speed with which the economy moves from 
Go to G”, which m turn 1s determined by the rate of response to factor pnce 
differentials Clearly, the faster this response the better, since every instant 
spent away from the new long-run eqmhbrmm mvolves a loss of national 
output valued at world prices The only pohcy problem therefore 1s to speed 
up the rate of transfer of inputs 
More interesting and reahstlc problems arise, however, when we recogmse 
the posslblhty of input price, and m particular wage, rigidity If the wage rate 
w,, 1s rigid downward, then the impact effects of the fall m p 1s to cause 
unemployment m Y’ We assume m this paper that workers m Y are 
umomsed and refuse to accept a wage cut, and so lay-offs result * Thus, m 
fig l(b) demand for labour m Y at the ngld wage w. falls to Li, employment 
m X remains at L$ and unemployment of Ly’-Lz occurs Production of Y 
falls to the point indicated by G”’ m (c), while no corresponding increase m 
output of X takes place Thus, m (a) the rental rate m Y falls to rg’ 
Assuming that the wage rate m Y remains fixed at wt, the burden of 
adjustment falls on the X-sector, which 1s taken here to be non-umomsed 
The unemployed bid down the wage rate m X until full-employment 
equlhbrlum 1s restored at B”‘, with a wage rate of wz’ and rental r:l’ Note 
that m the final (sector-specific apital) equlhbrmm G”’ m (c), output of X IS 
too large and that of Y too small relative to the equlhbnum with wage 
flexlblhty, G” This represents an output mefticlency essentially due to the 
excess of the marginal value product of labour m Y( = w,“) over that m X 
( = wi’) The economy 1s at a ‘distorted eqmhbrmm’ 
‘By setting wy = w: = constant m (2), re-expressmg (5) as 
r’,(w,O,r,)Y+ U,=L,O, 
where U, 1s unemployment m Y (mltlally zero), and carrymg out the comparative statics of the 
system (1)46) with respect o a change m p, we can show that 
i 
B 8” f CT,=- cry+-CT,+- - 
l-/3 > 1-B” l9y 
The change m U, 1s expressed as a proportion of the mltlal employment level m Y, O, 1s the 
elastlclty of factor substltutlon m sector I=X, Y, 8” 1s the proportion of the economy’s total 
capital mstalled m X and ~9’ IS the share of capital m output of sector 1=X, Y Thus, with wy 
fixed, a fall m p rmses U, It 1s straightforward also to derive condltlons for a ‘magnification 
effect’ 8, >@, though this does not seem to be of interest m the present context 
*AlternatIvely, a labour contract may be m force which does not provide for wage 
adjustments m the event of output pnce fluctuations 
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The appropriate choice of pohcy to correct this equlhbnum dlstortron 1s 
well known ’ By paying an output or wage subsidy to industry Y the labour 
demand curve DC can be shifted up to b, m fig l(b) so as to lead to labour 
demand L,” at wage rate w” Note that there IS no equivalent instrument or 
pohcy which can be applied to X any pohcy which shifts 0,” leaving Dy” 
unaffected alters the wage rate m X but cannot achieve point G” m (c) This 
1s because increasing labour demand m X cannot increase employment m Y 
However, our concern 1s this paper 1s not with the question of the 
correction of the static dlstortlon, but rather with the time-path of 
adJustment of the economy after the price change has taken place The 
market adjustment process takes place along the demand curve 0,” and IS 
made at the cost of output losses and unemployment The question then 
arises of whether and how a dynamic pohcy can be formulated which 
produces a superior path of adjustment We now consider this question 
4. A dynamically optimal policy 
In the uncontrolled market economy the fall m the world price of the 
imported good results m a fall m its domestlc production level and m the 
demand for labour Because the workers refuse to accept a wage cut, lay-offs 
result, and no further adjustments m this sector take place The unemployed 
steadily ‘migrate’ to the export good sector, and create an excess supply of 
labour there The wage rate m this sector, though sticky, 1s not ngld, and the 
pressure of excess labour supply gradually bids down the wage rate until full 
employment 1s restored Since m each industry the margmal value product of 
labour 1s equated to the wage rate, that m X 1s lower than that m Y and so 
the final equlhbrmm 1s a distorted one 
We define the ‘planner’s problem’ m this economy m the followmg way 
The planner sets as his ultimate aim or end-point the resource allocation 
which maxlmlses national output at world prices, le the pomt G” m fig l(c) 
The ObJective which determines the path he takes m gettmg there 1s to 
mmmuse the total cost of not being at that point, 1 e the cumulative loss of 
potential national output along the adjustment path For simplicity we 
assume a zero discount rate m the main analysis (though we shall point out 
the lmphcatlons of a posltlve discount rate once the basic results have been 
derived) 
The instrument available to the planner 1s a production subsidy paid to 
the Y industry, which 1s financed by lump-sum taxation (e g on the rents to 
capital m X and Y) and which therefore is non-dlstortlonary It 1s well 
known that such a subsidy 1s superior to a tariff since the latter creates a 
trade dlstortlon A wage subsidy payable to the Y industry can be shown to 
‘See Corden (1974) 
234 B A Forster and R Rees, Rate of de&e of an me&lent mdustry 
be an equivalent Instrument to a production subsidy, so need not be 
explicitly considered A wage (or production) subsidy paid to the X-industry 
1s a posslblhty which raises interesting issues m relation to the dynamic 
adjustment process assumed here, and so will be considered m section 5 
below 
In choosmg the time-path of production subsidy, the planner 1s 
constrained by essentially the same kmd of adjustment process which 
characterlses the uncontrolled economy - he was to rely on unemployment to 
induce labour migration and bid down the wage rate m X We adopt a very 
simple formahsatlon of this process a single parameter 1 represents both the 
effect of unemployment m Y m mducmg a shift of labour supply to X, and 
the effect of the excess labour supply to X m bidding down the (sticky) wage 
rate w, 
One central result of the analysis 1s the followmg intervention by the 
planner will m general improve upon the uncontrolled market solution, and 
the optimal path mvolves trading off the benefit of unemployment m 
speeding up the adJustment process and Increasing the value of total output 
against its cost m the form of loss of current output lo We now set out our 
model formally 
Denoting the short-run profit functions m X and Y by zx(w,) and nY(w,), 
respectively, Hotelhng’s lemma yields the labour demand functions 
L = - %xw,), L, = - %xw,“, I.9 
The production functions can therefore be written 
x = f”( - %hJ), Y=f’( - exw,“, PN 
(the constant capital terms have been suppressed) 
Excess supply of labour m the economy 1s -(L, + L, --Lo) Taking the 
parameter 1 to encapsulate both the rate at which unemployed workers m Y 
transfer then ex ante supply to X, and the rate at which the wage rate m X 
“This result was antlclpated by Lapan (1976) However, our model differs from Lapan’s m a 
number of respects He takes the wage rates m the two sectors to be always equal, even though 
there IS no mechanism m his model by which this can be ensured Unemployment m Y causes 
excess supply of labour m X, which IS absorbed by means of a general wage subsidy 
Unfortunately, he does not denve the time-path of this subsidy dnectly, but mfers It from the 
optimal paths of unemployment ( he instrument) and labour supply m X (the state vanable) As 
a result the optimal time-path of the subsidy IS specltied m an mcomplete and very cumbersome 
way and, where directly comparable, our results are the opposite of his Finally, Lapan adopts a 
‘fixed time horizon free end-pomt’ formulation of the problem, whxh, though useful for the 
theoretical issues he 1s consldermg, has the undesirable result that the optimal time path does 
not converge to the point at whxh the value of natlonal output at world prices IS maxmused 
even m ‘the long-run’, margmal value products of labour are not equahsed across sectors It 
seems more reasonable to us to adopt a formulation which mvolves almmg at this point 
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adjusts to excess labour supply, we have [usmg (8)] the simple adjustment 
equation 
w, = A 
[ 
- xX,( w,) - x’,( w;, p) - I? 
1 
) A>0 
The strict convexity of the profit function applies 
di,=-~n” <() 
dw, ww ’ 
(11) 
and so that value w,* which, for p=p equates aggregate demand and supply 
of labour, can easily be shown to be a globally stable eqmhbnum 
The pohcy problem 1s that of choosmg the value of a production subsidy 
z 2 0 to be paid to domestic producers, lmplymg a producers’ price p+ z 
Consumers go on buying at the world price 8, and so there are no 
consumption dlstortlons associated with this pohcy 
The cntenon we adopt IS 
mm j[3-Vjd& 
(T, T(f)} 0
(12) 
where V=X+pY IS the value of national output at world prices and P 1s the 
maximum long-run sustaznable value of output at world prices The criterion 
m (12) says that we seek a pohcy which achieves the best available 
sustainable eqmhbrmm (SubJect to fixed sectoral capital stocks) with the 
mmlmum cumulative loss of national income m getting there The terminal 
time IS also a vanable m the optlmlsatlon process and IS solved for 
endogenously 
The fixed end-point (z^, v+~, n of the control problem IS determined by 
solving 
max V= f”( - ~L$(w,)) +pS’( - 7c’,(p + z)) 
(1. WJ 
st - ti,( wx) - a’,@ + z) - Lo 5 0, 
(13) 
(14) 
(We place the direct restnctlon on z because we want to consider exphcltly 
condltlons under which z^ = 0 ) 
The Lagrange function 1s 
(15) 
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and necessary condltlons are 
8L 
-= -f;+&=o, 
aw, 
aL 
z^ZO, qoi - pff] = 0, (17) 
We would naturally expect f: > 0 and so di > 0 and the optimum mvolves full 
employment z^ >0 implies jfi =fi We know from the diagrammatic 
analysis of the previous section that z^=O implies ft<jf;, and so a zero 
production subsidy cannot maxlmlse the sustainable value of national output 
Hence, Z >O m the final controlled equzbbrzum, so that marginal value 
products (at world prices) are equated across sectors 
In the controlled eqmhbrmm the optimal z^ raises labour demand m Y to 
fi,, m fig l(a), and marginal value products of labour ff = $, and pf; -6, 
are equahsed Note that m equlhbrmm, 6, can be defined as the shadoH 
przce of labour zn I: and 1s equal to the wage m X In effect, then, the fixed 
end-point of the dynamic problem 1s the sector-specific apital eqmhbrmm 
G” m fig l(c), with the value z^ precisely that which corrects the ‘static 
distortion’ 
The optimal controlled adJustment path is then found by mmimlsmg (12) 
with P given, SubJect to the dlfferentlal equation constraint (lo), and again 
~20 In order that a path (f(t), G,,(t)) be optimal, it 1s necessary that there 
e;st functions H and $(t) such that 
H=B-v+$L[-Zx,-7Ly,-L0], (19) 
H, = [jfE - ljn]n’,, 2 0, z^ZO, H,=O, (20) 
H(t)=H@)=O (22) 
If z^( t) > 0 at t < ci: (20) implies 
where o,(t), 1s the ‘dynamic shadow price of labour’ At each instant on the 
adlustment path employment m Y is such that the margmal value product of 
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labour there 1s equated to its margmal social cost This latter, the term $A, 1s 
the contnbutlon unemployment m Y makes to the desired adjustment of 
outputs, via its pressure on w, a small amount of unemployment not created 
means a httle less pressure on the wage rate m X, hence a smaller expansion 
of employment and output there Thus, the optimal subsidy can be thought 
of as trading off the lost output arlsmg from unemployment against the value 
of unemployment m generating the required resource reallocations m a 
decentrahsed economy 
We obtain insight mto the nature of the optimal adJustment path by 
consldermg the phase portrait of eqs (20) and (21) Stationary values of $ 
and wx, respectively, require 
The correspondmg stationary loci have slopes 
where, from (23) 
(24) 
(25) 
In fig 2, therefore, the 4 =0 locus is drawn upward slopmg and the E = 0 
locus downward slopmg Their mtersectlon pomt (G;,,$) 1s the optimal end- 
-- \E=o 
I 
I 
e 
wx WX 0 
Rg 2 
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point and can be reached along the stable branch indicated It 1s 
straightforward to show that (a,,$) 1s a saddle pomt 
The phase hagram m fig 2 can be explained as follows The variable $ 1s 
the costate vanable associated with the dynamic constraint m (10) It gives 
the margmal value of a slight acceleration m the speed of adjustment of the 
wage rate m X The curve labelled E=O shows values ($, w,) at which 
labour demand 1s equal to labour supply, 1 e full employment It has a 
negative slope because the higher the wage rate m X, the higher must be the 
production subsidy z m Y required to achieve full employment [refer to fig 
l(b)], and the hgher 1s z, the greater the employment m Y; the lower the 
marginal value product of labour there and the lower 1s tj [from (23)] If, for 
any $, w, 1s too high for full employment, so that we are to the right of the E 
=0 locus, labour supply exceeds demand m X and w, will be falling The 
converse is the case for a pomt to the left of the locus This explains the 
directions of the horizontal arrows m the figure Any point on the locus 1s a 
potential equlhbrmm pomt only as far as the labour market 1s concerned 
The $=O locus shows the set of (II/, w,) pairs which satisfy the second 
equlhbrlum condltlon, namely that $ should be constant over time, which m 
turn [from (21)] requires that the marginal value product of labour m X be 
equal to that m Y This locus 1s upward sloping because the higher the 
marginal product of labour m I: the higher 1s $, and the higher would have 
to be the margmal product of labour m X (= w,) to preserve the equality If, 
for any w,, + such as to gve a pomt below the 4 = 0 locus, 1 e f: > $1, (21) 
indicates that tj must be falling (recall 71X,, >O), and conversely for a point 
above the locus This gves the direction of the vertical arrows m the figure 
The only point of overall equlhbrlum 1s then the mtersectlon of the two 
curves there 1s full employment and marginal value products of labour are 
equahsed across sectors Moreover, if we are to the nght of this point and 
between the two curves the ($, w,) pairs will be moving south-westward, 
while if we are to the left of this point and between the two curves the ($, w,) 
pairs will be moving north-eastward We can then find a path for these paw, 
one m each segment, whch terminate at the equlhbrlum The optimal pohcy 
1s to get onto and move along one of these paths from wherever we mltlally 
happen to be 
We obtain further insight mto the dynamics d we note that setting z(t) = 0 
at any t gives, from (23) 
and we denote by +* the unique +-value this implies In the uncontrolled 
model 
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since employment m Y is adjusted to keep j$fk equal to w; It follows that 
throughout the uncontrolled market adjustment $ remains constant at tj* In 
fig 3, therefore, the uncontrolled market economy begms at the point 
(w,“, $*) and ends up at (w,*, $*) The former pomt lies on 4=0 since of 
course at that point 
fZ( - e4) = PfE( - Jaw;, P)) = $2 
Fig 3 
The E” = 0 locus is generated from 
EOr -?r:(w,)-~xyw(w,o,p+T)--=o, (30) 
1 e we require labour market equrhbnum at the znztuzl price p but now allow 
~20 and w, can vary For $ he*, r=O, therefore w, = wz satisfies (30) For 
$2 I+P we have r>O and w, must increase to mamtam (30) Thus, the E” 
locus is vertical for $2 I,+* and negatively sloped for + c $*, as shown m fig 
3 
If we now reduce p to @, clearly the new locus 
IT= -~~(w,)-~‘,(w,o,~+z)-~Loo, (31) 
must he to the left of I?‘, since for every value of z and t+!~ a lower w, 1s 
required to satrsfy (31) The market economy, with z =0, moves to the new 
comer at (w:, $*), whereas the optimum 1s at (GJ~, $) Thus, taking (wz, I,$*) 
as the starting pomt, the optimal pohcy 1s to pay an lmmedrate productron 
subsrdy to put the economy on to the stable path and then contmue along rt 
- increasing r gradually - untrl the optrmum IS reached There will of 
course be unemployment, both mttlally and along the adjustment path, since 
this 1s required to expand output of X, but unemployment IS lower than m 
the uncontrolled case The dynamic shadow prrce of labour, w,,, will be 
JPE-E 
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positive and falhng [see (23)] and will be below the wage rate m X at every 
instant until they are finally equal at the optimal end-pomt Fig 4 illustrates 
the optimal tune paths of the relevant variables 
Rg 4 
5. Conclusions and geueralisations 
We have shown that m an economy m which capital IS sector specific, 
labour IS imperfectly mobile and wage rates are sticky, intervention to ease 
the adlustment of an industry which IS mefflclently large as a result of foreign 
competltlon can yield a better outcome than that resultmg from market 
forces alone We have defined one kmd of optimal pohcy a production 
subsidy whxh raises employment m the ‘mefflaent industry’ above the level 
implied by market forces, and increases steadily to the level required to 
achieve the new ‘neo-classical eqmhbrmm’ (which the uncontrolled economy 
does not itself reach) There still are, however, nutlal layoffs m the meficlent 
industry, since these are required to bring about reallocation of labour 
supplies to the rest of the economy. The optimal path trades off the output 
loss from this unemployment against the benefit of the reallocation of labour 
The latter, which falls steadily along the optimal path, defines the ‘dynamic 
shadow price’ of labour This IS always positive, although below the wage 
rate m both sectors as long as there IS less than full employment 
There are clearly several respects m which the model could be 
generahsed I1 First, mstruments other than a production subsidy could be 
considered As long as the subsidy IS financed m a non-dlstortlonary way It IS 
“Introduction of a posltlve discount rate makes no essential difference to the results Because 
the value of current output rises relative to that m the future, the optimal productlon subsidy 
mcreases, unemployment 1s lower, and convergence to the optnnal end-point (unaffected by the 
discount rate) 1s slower 
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supenor to a tariff, but this need no longer be true If this assumption 1s 
relaxed The issue of the choice of instrument 1s then a substantive one 
In addition, a wage subsidy m X could be used to induce that industry to 
absorb any excess labour supply as soon as it presents itself, and therefore 
could speed up the adjustment process In other words, the stickmess of the 
response of w, to excess supply would be eliminated and the adJustment 
process consists only of the ‘mlgratlon’ of labour from Y to X I2 The optnnal 
wage subsidy m X would then be whatever 1s required to absorb the switch 
of labour from I: induced or controlled by the production subsidy m Y Of 
course, m the absence of any stickmess m the migration process the dynamic 
optlmlsatlon problem would not exist Setting the production subsidy z^ and 
the wage subsidy (w”- w”) [see fig l(b)] would immediately establish the 
long-run optimum l3 Reahstlcally, however, labour migration would not be 
instantaneous and so there 1s scope for a dynamic analysis 
A further respect m which the model could be generahsed relates to our 
specification of the adjustment process, which is admittedly very crude 
Taking a constant speed of adjustment 2 begs a number of questions, and m 
particular ignores the choice-theoretic basis of the labour migration 
decision l4 A richer specification of the adjustment process would certainly 
appear to be fruitful [compare the analysis of capital stock adJustment 
carried out by Mussa (1978)] 
On the face of it the assumption that the wage rate m Y 1s absolutely rl@d 
while that m X 1s flexible, though sticky, seems very restnctlve The point is, 
however, that wage rates do not m fact adjust fast enough to ensure full 
employment followmg the ‘price shock’, and the burden of adjustment falls 
on the transfer of labour supply to and wage changes m other sectors The 
relatwe stickmess of wages 1s what matters, and the extreme assumption 
adopted here 1s the simplest way of representing what appears to be the case 
“As m Lapan’s model However, the resulting model would still be slgmficantly different 
Lapan has a smgle wage subsidy paid umformly across both sectors, which must do the work of 
two separate instruments m the present case - the production subsidy m Y and wage subsidy 
m X It 1s this self-imposed constramt on instruments which seems to us to create the dlfflcultles 
m speclfymg the optimal time-path of the wage subsidy m Lapan’s model 
13We are grateful to one of the referees for making this pomt 
14Agam, we thank a referee for this pomt 
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